Italy, which ranges among the OECD countries with the highest share of shadow economy, has adopted in 1998 a peculiar audit scheme (Studi di Settore), for small and medium enterprizes and self-employed. This scheme is based on a particular interaction between the Tax Agency and taxpayers, where the Tax Agency unveils part of the information used to develop its audit rule. We study this scheme by means of a simple theoretical model and test it using a sample of 23,000 firms in manufacturing sectors in 2005 tax year.
Introduction
In the concluding section of their review, Andreoni et al. (1998, pp. 855-56) indicate four directions for future research in the field of tax evasion. The first of these is "a greater synthesis of theory with empirical research" while the third is to pay "a greater attention to the dynamic and complex institutional framework of tax compliance (...) including (...) the significance of various forms of interactions between the tax authority and the taxpayers such as (...) information reporting". In this
paper, we aim to analyze the theoretical assessment of a simple model of taxpayers'behaviour when the tax authority and the taxpayers interact in a complex institutional framework.
In Italy the size of the shadow economy ranges at top levels among OECD countries, accounting for 20-30% of the GDP according to Schneider and Enste (2000) . To contrast tax evasion, since 1998 Italy has adopted a tax auditing scheme which is focused on small-scale economic activities of firms or of self-employed people. This scheme is known as Studi di Settore (henceforth, SdS) and is based on a particular interaction between the Tax Agency and the taxpayers. A peculiar characteristic of the SdS is that the Tax Agency declares to use the information provided by the taxpayer and reveals to each taxpayer how much he should pay for avoring a tax audit. To our knowledge, this is the only case where the audit rule is, to a considerable extent, known to taxpayers, thus providing an interesting case study.
SdS has two noticeable features. First, the Tax Agency can audit and fine only firms whose reports are below a threshold which is known to the taxpayer, similarly to a cut-off auditing rule. This means that a firm whose report is above that threshold knows that it will not be be audited.
Second, and contrarily to what happens with a standard cut-off rule, such a value is the output presumed by the Tax Agency which depends on the value of inputs (as reported by the taxpayer) and on their presumed productivity (as presumed by the Tax Agency). Thus the determinants of the probability to be audited are, though only partially, known to taxpayers. Moreover, the taxpayer can, to some extent, manipulate the information that determines the probability to be audited, which also depends on the value of inputs as reported by every taxpayer. For a detailed description of SdS, see Arachi and Santoro (2007) and Santoro (2008) .
The design and implementation of Italian SdS provide a good framework where some key questions concerning taxpayers' behaviour can be addressed. Do taxpayers behave as predicted by the economic theory? What variables influence the taxpayers'reporting behaviour? Santoro (2008) provides only a partial answer to these questions. He presents a model of taxpayers' behaviour under SdS where it is shown that reports should depend on a number of features of the scheme such as audit probabilities, sanctions, tax rates and the cost of manipulation. This theoretical result seems in line with some stylized facts, but no empirical validation of the model predictions has been provided so far. This paper is a step in this direction.
In this paper, we present a simplified model to describe the behaviour of a rational taxpayer when the audit rule is (partially) known.
Our main objective is to test some assessed relations between taxpayers' reporting behaviour and variables such as the audit probability, the tax rate, the concealment costs. We use a sample of 23,000 observations to test these relations, taking into account the problem of endogeneity which naturally arises in this field of research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the literature on optimal audit policies and the (relatively) scant evidence on real-world audit practices by tax agencies. Section 3 introduces the main institutional features of SdS. In Section 4 the theoretical model is illustrated and its main predictions are commented. Section 5 describes the empirical model, the dataset and the choice of proxies adopted for measuring the key variables of the model and it discusses results.
Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
Audit rules in theory and practice
The simplest way to audit tax returns is to use a random rule (as in Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) , in which the probability of an audit is fixed across taxpayers and does not depend on taxpayers' reports. A more general framework has been developed where the probability of being audited varies across taxpayers according to reports made. This literature distinguishes between audit rules with and without commitment (Andreoni et al., 1998) . Audit rules with commitment are pre-announced by the Tax Agency to taxpayers and implemented after taxpayer reports are made, while audit rules without committment remain totally unknown to taxpayers. The existing literature on optimal tax audits (Sanchez and Sobel, 1993; Scotchmer, 1987) suggests that, if the Tax Agency can commit to the audit rule, then the optimal audit rule typically involves a threshold, i.e. a value of the target variable (income or profit) which cuts off the taxpayers' population into two parts.
Taxpayers reporting income lower than the threshold should be audited with some positive probability. This probability should be high enough to induce truthful reporting by these taxpayers. On the other hand, taxpayers reporting income higher or equal than the threshold should not be audited. The resulting equilibrium is such that all taxpayers whose true income is below the threshold will report their true income while all taxpayers whose true income is higher than the threshold will report the threshold and evade the difference between their true income and the threshold. The threshold depends on the distribution of taxpayers' true income, on the value of the sanction and on auditing costs.This result applies equally to all taxpayers, persons or firms, who behave as risk-neutral maximizers of after-tax income (or profit).
If the Tax Agency cannot commit to an audit rule, then the optimal audit policy becomes somewhat more complex. The optimal rule emerges as the equilibrium of a full-information sequential game. If the equilibrium is the fully separating one, in which each observed report is associated with a single true income level, all taxpayers evade taxes by the same amount and the audit rule is the solution of a linear first-order differential equation. However, many other (pooling) equilibria are possible.
Cut-off rules are an example of an endogenous tax audit rule, i.e. rules where the probability of audit varies across taxpayers and depend upon the behavior of taxpayer (Alm and McKee, 2003) . The experimental literature (Alm et al., 1993; Kirchler, 2007, p. 109) generally confirms that cut-off rules yield higher compliance rates than random audits, although cut-off rules may trigger some kind of coordination between taxpayers (Alm and McKee, 2003) .
Apparently, many tax agencies do adopt cut-off auditing rules and concentrate their audit resources on firms declaring returns below given thresholds, but the exact formulation of these cut-off points is not publicly known (Andreoni et al., 1998) . Many countries adopt a statistical approach to tax auditing without disclosing the determinants of the probability of an audit. For example, the US tax authorities use the Discriminate Information Function (DIF), a computer-generated score designed to predict tax returns most likely to result in additional taxes if 
The Italian cut-off auditing rule
Since 1998, Italy has adopted the SdS a tax auditing scheme, which is mainly focused on small-scale economic activities, i.e. on those reporting an annual output below 5,164,569 euros. As our empirical analysis uses data about manufacturing firms only, let us only briefly describe how SdS work for firms (corporated and unincorporated companies, individual entrepreneurs), hence avoiding to describe SdS for self-employed workers.
The Tax Agency collects information on structural variables (e.g. First, the Tax Agency is committed not to audit firms whose output reports are above a given threshold, which is revealed to each firm.
Second, this threshold is firm-specific as it depends on the information provided by the taxpayer to the Tax Agency. Following Santoro (2008) we can define the probability of being audited, q i , for firm i as 1ˆ1 ifˆ0
The idea embodied in 1 is that the probability of an audit is a combination of objective and subjective elements. The objective part is the fact that, according to the Italian legislation, the probability of an audit based on SdS is decreasing in the ratio ˆî i R < BX and zero when such a ratio is higher than or equal to 1. The subjective part is reflected by δ i :, the higher this value, the lower the probability i's perceived probability to be audited for a given value of the ratio ˆî Under SdS, the Tax Agency is committed to audit only reports under the threshold, but SdS differs from other committing audit schemes described in Section 2 since the threshold varies across taxpayers, being dependent, for each taxpayer, from his own value of inputs.
The model
The model we present here modifies that proposed by Santoro (2008) According to the description of SdS provided in Section 3, to account for the their specific institutional framework one should consider the audit rules and the concealment activity of both output and inputs.
Santoro (2008) does this by considering two separate and independent audit rules (one for output and the other for inputs) and deriving optimal values of ˆi R taking ˆi X . Here, we ignore input audits and concealment costs and we focus only on the choice of ˆi R taking ˆi X as given.
We denote as H i (.) the cost of concealing output for firm i, whose argument is the difference between the true and reported output, î
. We assume, without loss of generality that, since there are no tax abatements for overreporting, this difference is always nonnegative. We 
with respect to ˆ,
In (2), τ i is i's effective the tax rate, q i is the probability of an output audit as perceived by the taxpayer as defined in (1) 1 When the taxpayer is willing to pay immediately, the audit is concluded by granting the taxpayer a 'discount' with respect to ˆi BX . We generalize this possibility, which is very common in reality, by assuming 0<f<1 and we define f as a 'gross' fine since it includes this discount. Note all results would be unchanged by admitting f≥1.
To derive the optimal value of ˆ, i R we have to compare two values of P: that obtained if i chooses to report ˆî i R < BX thus generating a positive probability whose exact value depends upon δ i (recall (1)) and the value of P i when ˆî i R ≥ BX so that q i =0 (see (1)).
Let us introduce the following notation ˆâ rg min if ˆâ rg min i f
so that i R  is the optimal value of ˆi R if the taxpayer decides to report below presumed output while i R is the optimal value of ˆi R if the taxpayer decides to report at least presumed output .
It can be shown
Equation (3) is saying that, when the taxpayer decides to report below presumptive output, the report depends on the probability to be audited, the fine, the marginal concealment cost and the tax rate. In particular, equation (3) shows that reported output increases in marginal concealment cost, H', and decreases in the tax rate, τ i . To proceed further, we introduce two assumptions:
: the marginal concealment cost is always smaller than the effective tax rate, so that no output would be reported if there were no audits at all;
f f δ δ < < < ∀ : the probability of an audit has an upper bound (<1) and a lower positive bound which are chosen to mimic anecdotal evidence for a representative taxpayer.
The meaning of A.1 is to limit the importance of concealment costs: they can motivate the choice to report an output up to the presumed level, but not to report an output which is over this level. out for the empircal application to follow. Therefore we write:
and we focus on the choice between reporting either R i
Finally, A.1 has two further implications for the interpretation of (3):
: the higher is the perceived probability of an audit for a given difference between ˆi BX and ˆi R the higher is reported output for a given report of inputs;
ii) the ratio / i i R BX  is increasing in f: the higher is gross fine, the higher is reported output.
To evaluate the meaning of assumption A.2, consider that the average value of f observed in data is around 0.6. If we take the latter as the value relevant for a representative taxpayer, equation (1) generates a perceived probability of an audit which varies as illustrated in 1. This means that we assume that a representative taxpayer believes that the Tax Agency is very sensitive to small deviations from presumed output. Thus, our assumption embodies a possible missperception, i.e.
overestimate of the probability of an audit when SdS is used. There is anecdotal evidence that such a missperception was generated, at least 
Inequality (5) (iv) decreasing in the tax rate, τ.
Empirical application

The empirical model
Ideally, the model outlined in Section 4 should be tested using a structural model of firms and tax agency behaviour, with data on before and after a random implementation of SdS, where we could observe treated and untreated firms and test the difference in their reactions.
Unfortunately the data we have do not allow a proper causal analysis and our results have to be interpreted only in descriptive terms. The empirical model we estimate regresses the ratio of reported output over the threshold on a set of variables providing measures of the effective tax rate, the sanction if cought underreporting, the cost of concealment.
Let y ic be the ratio of reported output of firm i belonging to cluster c over the firm-specific threshold, Z i be the vector of variables providing proxies of concealment costs for firm i, p c be the cluster-specific average sanction if a firm belonging to cluster c is caught underreporting, and t i be the firm-specific tax rate on the value of output. We estimate the model: 
where {α,β,ψ,γ,η} are coefficients to be estimated, ε ic is the error term.
The dependent variable and some regressors are transformed in logarithms to interpret coefficients as elasticities.
There are two main issues concerning the estimation of model (6).
First, the estimation of model (6) Related to the particular data set we are analysing there is a third issue to consider: the estimation method adopted. As will be clearer after the data description (next subsection), the data we are using are upper-censored at 1, where a large spike emerges. Hence, we use maximum likelihood for estimating upper-censored Tobit models. 
The dataset and the selection of independent variables
Data for the analysis of SdS are produced by SOSE, To estimate model (6), we defined the dependent variable as the log of the ratio of total output declared and total presumptive output obtained by the application of SdS (we call this variable ratio). As proxies of the marginal concealment costs (H'), we use the log of firm's size defined as total square meters (sq_meter) and as number of full-time employees (empl_ft). We also consider the share of employees who are related by birth or marriage with the owner (sh_family). Our a priori are that the larger is the physical dimension and the workforce of a firm the more costly is to hide output,
5
As proxies of the probability of an audit for a given positive difference between the declared output ( and the contrary as for the share of family workers, among whom we expect a higher information sharing and agreement on concealment activities. The negative relationship between the number of employees and the propensity to evade is frequently postulated by the literature (see Slemrod, 2007 A quick look at the descriptive statistics in Table 2 In an attempt to find proxies for the independent variables of the theoretical model, we have selected and combined some of the variables included in the dataset with other data as described in Table 3 below. 
Results
As mentioned in Section 5.1, model (6) could possibly be flawed by endogeneity problem, which would cause wrong estimation of our key parameters. In particular, as the dependent variable we are using is the ratio of declared output and a threshold obtained by SdS using data on inputs, it could be that some regressors (namely, the size of the firm, the number of full-time employees, the share of family workers and the share of subcontract of total output) are correlated with the error term.
Hence, we tested the endogeneity of those variables using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test and results are presented in Table 4 . In neither case the null hypothesis of exogenous regressors is rejected, suggesting that IV methods are not required. This comes at no surprise as the total output and in particular SdS thresholds are related to these input variables in highly nonlinear ways.
Hence, we estimate some Tobit models with censoring at zero, trimming our dependent variable for values over zero. This procedure was followed because of the peculiar distribution at zero of the dependent variable, described in Subsection 5.2, and of the inability of our model to explain the behaviour of those declaring more than their SdS threshold. Results are presented in Table 5 , where we regress the dependent variable first on size variables only (column 1), then we introduced also the accuntancy regime and the effective tax rate measures (column 2) and finally also the fine and the audit probability measures, which we recovered from external data provided by the Tax Agency (columns 3 and 4). It should be noted that the last two columns present estimates on a much smaller sample size as fine and prob_audit variables present many missing values. Consistently with our a priori, the larger is a firm's work force the higher is its declared output although the sign of family workers share is opposite to our expectations meaning that the output declared is larger the higher is the share of family workers. The accounting regime is found to have a negative sign, consistently with our expectations, although it is not statistically significant when we also control for fine and audit probability. We find very little and not statistically significant effect of the share of subcontractors, while regional controls highlight the fact that underdeclaration is on average larger in the Southern regions, which is consistent with our expectations given the data on tax audits in different areas of the country.
We tested these results (in particular those in columns 2, 3 and 4 of by over 30%) and at 0.04 (increasing the sample size by nearly 50%).
Results are largely unchanged as for the (log) number of employees and for the family workers share. The square meter variables is found with significant positive values and the share of subcontracting with a very small but significantly negative coefficient, both consistently with our a priori expectations, discussed above.
A common feature of the models presented in Tables 5 and 6 is that covariates provide relatively little improvements on a simple model with the constant only, as shown by the pseudo R-squared index. Although not unusual in Tobit models estimated using maximum likelihood, this
suggests that most of the variability of the dependent variable is not captured by the observed variables. As there is no possibility to extact additional information on the idyosincratic error term, we followed a different strategy based on analysing variability of our dependent variable between industry codes (ateco) setting at zero the variability within it. Hence, we generated a new data set, collapsing all variables in our original data set by industry codes and estimating model (6) by OLS.
Interestingly, the sign and significance of the variables considered before remain largely unaltered, providing a further robustness check of our results. The goodness-of-fit of this model is over 20%, which is relevant considering the type of relation estimated. 
Concluding comments
The normative theory has not yet made much progress in providing concrete policy advice regarding the key tools of tax administration.
Following Slemrod (2007) we can distinguish two cases: (i) the case where information can be reported by a third party, for example when a firm reports to the Tax Agency the information about salaries and wages paid to its employees, (ii) the case where only interested parties are involved, as it usually happens for transactions involving firms and self-employed workers. In this second case, compliance will be low unless costly audits are undertaken. The literature has discussed various audit schemes where the Tax Agency makes use of the information provided by the taxpayers, but they have been judged as rather poor descriptions of real-world tax audit systems (Andreoni et al. 1998 ). One of the main problems is the lack of data about the way the information is used and disclosed by the Tax Agency.
In this paper, we tested some simple theoretical predictions about the behaviour of a rational taxpayer who can anticipate the way the information he provides the Tax Agency is used to implement the audit rule. These predictions arise from a simple theoretical model which aims at generalizing the institutional features of the peculiar Italian audit scheme (SdS) where a report can be audited only if it is below a presumptive value, which depends on information reported by the taxpayer.
Our dataset comprises a large number of observations, approximately 23,000, but does not allow for a counterfactual analyis and thus cannot be used for a full causality analysis. Results are only partly in line with the theoretical model, and this may depend on the fact that many variables, such as the marginal concealment cost or the subjective probability of an audit, cannot be observed directly. However, a number of theoretically relevant relations seem confirmed. In particular, taxpayers' reports seem to be positively associated with size, as measured by number of employees and by some physical variables.
This result is in line with the idea that, among small and medium enterprises, concealment costs increase with size. This is consistent with Slemrod (2007) U-turn relaltionship between propensity to evade and size, although in this paper we only observe small and medium enterprises and have no information on the behaviour of larger firms.
The subjective probability to be audited is, at least in part, also relevant in a standard way: when taxpayers know that the probability to be audited decreases because of the availability of some legal shields, as the one provided to subcontractors and firms using complete accounting, they tend to report less. Also, regional differences in the propensity to underreport seem to matter, as reports are lower, relatively to the threshold, for taxpayers operating in Southern regions. On the contrary, other factors which are expected to influence the behaviour by taxpayers, such as the probability of audit and the amount of fine observed in the past, or the expected tax rate have no or ambigous impact on reporting behaviour.
